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In this paper we study the welfare effect of a monopoly innovation. Unlike 
many partial equilibrium models carried out in previous studies, general 
equilibrium models are constructed and analyzed in greater details. We 
discover that, technical innovation carried out by a monopolist could 
significantly increase the social welfare. We conclude that, in general, the 
criticism against monopoly innovation based on its increased dead weight 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic literatures abound as far as studies related to the welfare losses as a result of 
monopolization are concerned. Most of them, however, are analyzed with partial 
equilibrium models. Many authors’ attacks against monopoly are based on the dead 
weight loss. As for technical innovation, they argue that, while innovation reduces the 
monopolist’s marginal cost and increases the consumer surplus and producer surplus in 
the monopoly market, it causes a much bigger dead weight loss than before; and because 
of the substantial misallocation of resources, the total welfare effect can be negative. In 
this paper, we attempt to discuss this issue with a general equilibrium model. As shall be 
seen from our general equilibrium analysis, and unlike the suggestion by some authors as 
mentioned above, we show that a technical innovation by a monopolist actually increases 
the social welfare. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
Harberger (1954) was one of the pioneers in quantifying welfare losses due to monopoly. 
By adopting a partial equilibrium model that computes welfare losses in terms of the 
profit rate and the price elasticity of demand of an industry, he estimated welfare losses 
from monopoly in the United States in 1954 to be relatively insignificant (approximately 
0.1% of GNP), and economists like Schwartzman
1  (1960), Leibenstein (1966), Bell 
(1968), Scherer (1970), Shepherd (1972), and Worcester (1973) had confirmed his results.  
 
                                                 
1 Using similar estimates as Harburger, Schwartzman (1960) provided similar conclusions that the welfare 
loss from monopoly had been small, and that income transfers resulting from monopoly were small in the 
aggregate. Even when the elasticity of demand is assumed to be equal two, the welfare loss probably was 
still less than 0.1 percent of the national income in 1954.   4
Harberger’s type of results had been met with several criticisms. Stigler (1956) and 
Kamerschen (1966) argued that welfare losses due to monopoly pricing might be greater 
than what Harberger and Schwartzman (1960) computed. Stigler used Harberger’s 
welfare model and his own estimates of profits, and assumed a range of reasonable values 
for the elasticity of demand.  He thought the limits within which the monopoly welfare 
losses lie were very broad, depending on the extent of actual monopoly power. Using 
data for the years 1956-1957 and 1960-1961, Kamerschen (1966) proposed that the 
welfare costs under monopoly power and mergers had been understated in the earlier 
studies. Much of the earlier work still followed essentially the Harberger methodology, 
except for Bergson (1973), who criticized Harburger’s partial equilibrium framework, 
and put forward a general equilibrium model as an alternative. Bergson showed that the 
estimated welfare loss was heavily dependent on the value of other parameters, such as 
the elasticity of substitution and the distribution of price cost ratios, and his results 
showed that the welfare losses from monopoly were quite large. Bergson’s estimates had 
drawn reaction, particularly from Carson (1975) and Worcester (1975). 
 
Carson (1975) introduced a three-sector economy and estimated a 3.2 percent maximum 
welfare loss due to monopoly, which was considerably bigger than Harberger’s (1954) 
and Schwartzman’s (1960) calculations, but considerably less than Bergson’s maximum 
estimate.  Based on Harburger’s model and using disaggregated annual data for specific 
firms, Worcester (1973) presented a “maximum defensible” estimate of the welfare loss 
due to monopoly in the private sector of the U.S. economy during 1956-1969 and 
concluded that welfare loss as a result of monopolization was insignificant. Hefford and   5
Round (1978) later accounted for welfare cost of monopoly by applying Harberger-type 
estimates and Worcester’s (1973) approach in the Australian manufacturing sector for the 
period 1968-69 to 1974. Their results too suggested that only a relatively small 
proportion of GDP at factor cost was accounted for by welfare losses due to monopoly 
power.  
 
In contrast, using three independent methods and data sets, Parker and Connor (1979) 
estimated the consumer loss due to monopoly in the U.S. food-manufacturing industries 
in 1975. They found that consumer losses due to monopoly were around US$15 billions 
or approximately a quarter of U.S. GNP. Virtually all of the consumer loss was attributed 
to income transfers, and 3% to 6% was due to allocative inefficiency. Supporting this, 
Jenny and Weber (1983) showed the sensitivity of the measure of welfare loss based on 
the French economy. They found considerable allocative welfare losses, between 0.85% 
and 7.39% of GDP, and the welfare loss due to X-inefficiencies was as high as 5% of 
GDP. However, their estimates were highly tentative due to a lack in data quality and 
methodological difficulties. 
 
In addition, Cowling and Mueller (1978) obtained empirical estimates of the social cost 
of monopoly power for both the United States and United Kingdom. Their results showed 
a higher advertising expenses in the U.S., thus quadrupled the welfare loss estimate for 
the U.S. Evidence suggested that there was significant welfare loss due to monopoly 
power, with the presence of international distribution of these social costs in the U.K. 
Using a partial equilibrium framework, they proved that costs of monopoly power on an   6
individual firm basis were generally large. Attacking such model as yielding 
overestimates in terms of welfare losses, Littlechild (1981) introduced a model in an 
uncertain environment and argued that windfalls and innovation were more important 
than monopoly power. He suggested that works involving a long-run equilibrium 
framework in analyzing monopoly often failed to include any neutral or socially 
beneficial interpretation of monopoly.  
 
Friedland (1978) estimated the welfare gains from economy-wide demonopolization in a 
general equilibrium setting and found that the true welfare loss was consistently lower 
than the partial deadweight loss. Specifically, the size of the welfare gains was dependent 
on the extent of the product substitutability between the monopoly and competitive firms. 
The greater the substitutability, the greater the welfare gains and the less the difference 
between partial and general equilibrium estimates.  This result was supported by Hansen 
(1999), who examined the second-best antitrust issues related to the accuracy of 
estimating the true welfare loss. He too found that the estimate of deadweight loss under 
partial equilibrium was larger than the true loss and the difference between the two 
increased as the monopolist became larger.  More recently, by adopting a two-good 
general-equilibrium monopoly production model, Kelton and Rebelein (2003) found that 
social welfare under monopoly was higher than social welfare under perfect competition. 
This was especially true if the productivity for the monopolistically produced good is 
relatively low and if the benefit of the good is relatively high. Their results showed that 
the monopoly leads to higher equilibrium price and lower equilibrium quantity,   7
generating a smaller welfare for non-monopolists, and a larger welfare for monopolists 
than under perfect competition.  
 
As mentioned earlier, some economists proposed that the traditional analysis of 
monopoly pricing underestimated the social costs of monopoly. Under the perfectly 
discriminating model, Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), and Posner (1975) argued that 
since the whole rent might be dissipated in competitive process, the full monopoly profit 
should be added to the social cost of monopoly. Tullock (1967) maintained that the social 
costs of monopoly should include resources used to obtain monopolies and their 
opportunity costs while Posner (1975) argued that they should include the high costs of 
public regulation.  Koo (1970) too asserted that other than the loss of consumers’ surplus 
net of the monopolist’s gain in profits, the social opportunity loss of the monopolist as a 
result of inefficient use of resources should be included in calculating the social cost of 
monopoly. Even if economies of scale result in lower production costs, opportunity loss 
to society due to operations below optimum still exists. However, Shepherd (1972) 
claimed that the net social loss stemmed from the failure of the monopoly to price 
efficiently, and not the resulting loss from the monopolization of a competitive industry.  
Lee and Brown (2005) thought the conventional deadweight loss measure of the social 
cost of monopoly ignored the social cost of inducing competition.  Using applied general 
equilibrium model, they proposed a social cost metric where the benchmark is the Pareto 
optimal state of the economy instead of simply competitive markets.  
   8
Oliver Williamson (1968a, 1968b, 1969a, 1969b) investigated the welfare tradeoffs 
related to horizontal mergers. Merger can result in higher efficiencies and lower costs, or 
greater market power and higher prices. Welfare gains associated with reductions in cost 
typically outweighed the welfare losses imposed on consumers by the greater market 
power, thus, leading to a net increase in social welfare.  Innovation enables monopolists 
to lower their costs, to expand their outputs and to reduce their prices, thus it is 
conventional to conclude that social welfare unambiguously increases as a result. 
However, DePrano and Nugent (1969) pointed out that in Williamson’s (1968a) model, a 
fixed value for elasticity was used, but if a merger result in a movement along the 
demand curve instead of a shift of the demand curve, the value of the elasticity would be 
different. They further showed that if elasticities were low, it would be unlikely for a 
small merger to actually experience positive welfare effects.  
 
Geroski (1990) further listed three reasons to expect a negative direct effect of monopoly 
on innovation: (1) the absence of active competitive forces, (2) an increase in the number 
of firms searching for an innovation, and (3) incumbent monopolists enjoyed a lower net 
return from introducing a new innovation (Arrow 1962; Fellner 1951; Delbono and 
Denicolo 1991).  In addition, Reksulak, Shughart, and Tollison (2005) argued that cost-
saving innovation raised the opportunity cost of monopoly.  As a monopolist with market 
power became more efficient, greater amounts of surplus were sacrificed by consumers 
since the former increasingly failed to produce the new and larger competitive output. 
Thus, innovation raised the social value of competition by raising the deadweight cost of 
monopoly. They further contained that even without a rise in market power, the consumer   9
welfare sacrificed under the monopolist would still be larger than under the competitive 
firms.  In evaluating the monopoly welfare losses, Kay (1983) incorporated factors of 
production in a general equilibrium context and found that the summation of partial 
equilibrium estimates was likely to be inaccurate as an indicator of summed welfare costs. 
In the case where there were no constraints on the exercise of monopoly power, simple 
estimates for summing up the losses can be derived from the general equilibrium model, 
and these estimates suggested that welfare losses were potentially large.   
 
Some literatures look at labor-managed behavior of a monopolist in a partial equilibrium 
setting. According to Hill and Waterson (1983), labor-managed industry equilibrium 
produced less output hence less welfare, than its profit-maximizing counterpart if firms 
were symmetric. Neary (1984, 1985) showed than small levels of output could lead to an 
increased number of firms in labor-managed equilibrium if firms were asymmetric in 
relation to technology and/or demand. Using a general equilibrium model, Neary (1992) 
showed that under certain circumstances, the equilibrium of the labor-managed economy 
could include more firms and result in higher welfare than the profit-maximizing one.  If 
profits were positive, the labor-managed firms would not provide full employment. The 
entry of new firm can lower the unemployment and the wage rate, leading to lower total 
utility but a higher utility from consumption could lead to a higher total utility.  
 
We now present our model with capital as the single input in the next section. Then, in 
section 4, we consider the model with labor as the single input.  A brief concluding 
remark follows in section 5.    10
3. A Model with Capital as the Single Input 
 
Consider an economy with a competitive industry that includes many firms and an 
industry with a single monopoly firm. The competitive industry consists of F identical 
small firms, of which each produces the same product good 1, using the same input of 
natural resources (for example, land, and it will be referred to as capital), having the 
same production function q = k
1/2, where k is the amount of capital input. The monopolist 
produces good 2 with the capital input, and its production function is Q = tK, where K is 
the capital input, and t > 0 is a parameter representing the level of technology
2.   
 
There are M identical consumers, each having the same utility function u = [x1(x2 + 1)]
1/2, 
where xj is the amount of good j consumed. The asymmetric feature of the utility function 
implies that good 1 is a subsistence good required to be consumed to survive (for 
example, basic food); on the other hand, while the consumption of good 2 increases the 
utility from each unit of good 1 consumed, good 2 itself is not a subsistence good
3. Each 
consumer has an equal profit share from each and every firm, and all shares combined 
together equal to his total income. The total natural resource available in this economy is 
C, and each individual has an equal share. 
 
Let 1 be the price of good 1, and let v be the rental rate of capital.  
                                                 
2 In our discussion, for simplicity, we do not consider the R&D costs of technical innovation. The R&D 
costs are paid for just one period, while the consumers’ utility gains caused by innovation, it they do exist, 
will last for a lifetime. In this sense the R&D costs can be neglected if future utility is not too substantially 
discounted. 
3 In reality, a subsistence good such as food is hardly provided by a single private firm. Otherwise for profit 
maximization the monopolist would charge an extremely high price and would produce a very tiny amount.   11
 
The decision of each small firm is: 
 
Max π = k
1/2- vk                                  (1) 
 
from which one solves k = 1/(4v
2), q = 1/(2v), and π = 1/(4v). 
 
The decision of the monopoly is: 
 
Max Π = P(tK) - vK = P(K)(tK) - v(K)K                  (2) 
 
Note that the market clearing price P(K) for good 2 and the market clearing price for 
capital v(K) now are dependent on K. We have to first derive P(K) and v(K). According to 
the assumption on profit share, the income of each and every consumer is M
-1[F(4v)
-1 + 
P(K)tK - vK]. The income from renting of natural resources for each individual is Cv/M. 









-1 + P(K)tK - vK] [P(K)]
-1 - 0.5              (4) 
 
The total quantity demanded for good 2 is then:    12
 
Mx2 = 0.5[Cv + F(4v)
-1 + P(K)tK - vK][P(K)]
-1 - 0.5M             (5)        
 
For market clearing, it must hold that 
 
0.5[Cv + F(4v)
-1 + P(K)tK - vK][P(K)]
-1 - 0.5M = tK                                  (6) 
  
from which one can solve 
 
) )( ( 4
) ( )] ( [ 4
) (
2
tK M K v




=                     (7)
   





K = + 2 4
                                                              (8)
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Combining these results, we get:  
   13
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The first order condition reads: 
0 ) ( 2 2 2 2 ) ( 4 ) ( 6 2 2 2 ) ( 2 4 3 2 = − + + − − − + + − + K C M K M K C Mt K K C Mt MtK K K C t K t
       
                              ( 12)   
The solution is K = K*(M, C, t). 
 
Note that  
 
       ) (
1
1 K C F M x − =
− ,    ) ( 1
1
2 tK M M x + = +
−                 (13)
  
As a result,  
 
      
M
K C F tK M
u
4 / 1 2 / 1 )] ( [ ) ( − +
=                                                                                    (14) 
 
To get some numerical results, let us assume that M = 10,000, C = 10,000, and F = 100. 
Then,   14
0 ) 10000 ( 200000000 100000000
2








= − + + − − − + + − + K K K t tK K tK K K t K t
            
                                  (15) 
when t =1, equation (12) becomes: 
 
0 ) 10000 ( 200000000 100000000 2 ) 10000 ( 40000 ) 10000 ( 60000 2 20000 2 ) 10000 ( 4 3 = − + + − − − + + − + K K K K K K K K K
 
      (16) 
from which one solves K=1630.234 and u = 0.1064. 
 
Assuming the values of t between the range of 1 to 2, and solving for the corresponding 
values of K and u using simulation techniques, the relationship between t and u can be 
derived as shown in Figure 1.  
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
From Figure 1 we observe that u increases together with t. Thus we have 
 
Proposition 1. In our model with capital as the single input, as the technology of the 
monopolist advances, while more resources are used by the monopoly instead of by the 
competitive firms, the social welfare is actually increased. 
 
 
4. A Model with Labor as the Single Input   15
 
We now consider a model with labor only as the production input. The main difference 
between this model and the one in the last section is, consumers’ utilities depend not only 
on the consumption amounts of the firms’ products, but also depend on the amounts of 
leisure they enjoy.  
 
The economy under consideration consists of one competitive industry and one 
monopoly industry as before. Once gain the competitive industry consists of F identical 
small firms, of which each produces the same product of good 1, using the same input of 
labor, having the same production function q = n
1/2, where n is the amount of capital 
input. The monopolist produces good 2 with the labor input, and its production function 
is Q = tN, where N is the labor input, and t > 0 is a parameter representing the level of 
technology.   
 
Once gain there are M identical consumers, each having the same utility function of u = 
[Lx1(x2+1)]
1/3, where L is the leisure consumed, and xj is the amount of good j consumed. 
As before, the utility function implies that good 1 is a necessity, and while the 
consumption of good 2 increases the utility from each unit of good 1 consumed, good 2 
itself is not a necessity. Each consumer has one unit of time per period used either for 
working or for leisure. 
 
Let 1 be the price of good 1, and let w be the wage.  
   16
The decision of each small firm is: 
 
      Max π = n
1/2 – wn                      ( 1 7 )  
 
from which one solves n = 1/(4w
2), q = 1/(2w), and π = 1/(4w). 
 
The decision of the monopoly is: 
 
Max Π = P(N)t N   –   w N                (18) 
 
We have to first derive P(N) for market-clearing. According to the assumption on profit 
share, the profit income of each and every consumer is M
-1[F(4w)
-1 + P(N)tN - wN]. 
Consider the decision problem of each consumer: 
 
Max u = [Lx1(x2+1)]
1/3                      
s.t. wL + x1 + P(N)x2 = w + M
-1[F(4w)
-1 + P(N)tN - wN]          (19)
  
It is not difficult to derive 
 
     L = (1/3){w + M
-1[F(4w)
-1 + P(N)tN - wN] + P(N)}/w              (20) 
     x1 = (1/3){w + M
-1[F(4w)
-1 + P(N)tN - wN] + P(N)}                          (21) 
     x2+1 = (1/3){w + M
-1[F(4w)
-1 + P(N)tN - wN] + P(N)}/P(N)            (22)   17
     u = (1/3){w + M
-1[F(4w)
-1 + P(N)tN - wN] + P(N)}/[wP(N)]
1/3            (23)
  
Thus the total quantity demanded for good 2 is: 
 
Mx2 = (1/3)[Mw + F(4w)
-1 + P(N)tN - wN]/P(N) - 2M/3                                (24) 
 
For market clearing for good 2: 
 
Nt = (1/3)[Mw + F(4w)















=                      ( 2 6 )  
 
On the other hand, we have the following for labor market clearing: 
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w
F
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From which one solves 
 















) (                   (28)   18
 
Now we have 
 









=                      ( 2 9 )
  
Thus the profit of the monopolist is: 
 
















) (                   (30) 
 
The first order condition  0 ) ( ' = Π N yields 
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Now it is easy to verify 
w + M
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     u = 
M
Nt M N M F
9
) ( ) ( ) 108 ( 4
3 / 1 2 / 1 6 / 1 + −
               (36) 
 
Once again, we choose M = 10,000, F = 100, we can solve for N in terms of t from 
equation (31), and then determine the values of L, x1，x2，and u. Assuming the values of 
t in the range of 1 to 5, the relationship between t and u can be plotted from such 
simulation results as shown in Figure 2.   
 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
Once again from Figure 2, we observe that u increases with t. Thus we have 
 
Proposition 2. In our model with labor as the single input, as the technology of the 
monopolist advances, while more resources are used by the monopoly instead by the 
competitive firms, the social welfare is actually increased. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Most of the criticism against monopoly is based on its dead weight loss. With partial 
equilibrium models, some authors argue that innovation introduced by a monopolist 
could generate substantial dead weight loss and hence could lead to negative welfare 
effects. Our modeling and analysis have proved otherwise.  Although our analysis is 
based on two simple models, we believe that our conclusion that monopoly technical   20
innovation increases welfare is generally correct. In practice, the development of the 
information technology industry, to some extent does justify all our arguments! 
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Figure 1.  Model with Capital as the Single Input: Relationship between the Level of 




















Figure 2.  Model with Labor as the Single Input: Relationship between the Level of 
Technology and Utility 